



Motion of No-Confidence by Members of the National Parliament in the 7th Constitutional Government of Timor Leste

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Abstract

This study analyzes the political and legal implications of the Motion of No-Confidence by Members of the National Parliament in the 7th Constitutional Government of Timor Leste during the seventh (VII) administration of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. While the right to submit a motion of no confidence is constitutionally recognized for members of parliament, its application in this case resulted in a political anomaly that compelled the president to act decisively. The research aims to examine the legal basis, consequences, and implications of the president's decision to dissolve parliament and call for new elections. Employing a normative or doctrinal legal method, it draws on constitutional provisions, laws, regulations, and relevant case law. The analysis shows that the president's dissolution of parliament constituted an extralegal but necessary measure to avoid a governance vacuum and restore political stability. The findings indicate that, although parliamentary rights were exercised in accordance with constitutional principles, the broader political context required executive intervention to ensure continuity of government functions. The study concludes that such political-legal anomalies reveal the need for clearer legal frameworks and procedural guidelines governing motions of no confidence to balance parliamentary authority with governmental stability. The results provide valuable insights for legal scholars, policymakers, and public officials in understanding how constitutional mechanisms interact with practical governance, emphasizing the urgency of institutional reforms to prevent future crises.

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INTRODUCTION

Constitutionally, the Semi-Presidential government system has been practiced in the administration of the Timor Leste Government even though it is not regulated in the constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste in 2002 (Wallis & Neves, 2021). This has given rise to problems that are very difficult to resolve both legally and politically, for example, from the first constitutional government period to the seventh government period in 2017 (Cabral, 2025). Where there was a Motion of No Confidence from the national parliament to the government that did not approve the state revenue and expenditure budget twice in a row, causing the VII government to be ousted and a re-election to be held (GlobaLex, 2019). However, if we look more deeply, there are several aspects that are basic problems as follows: firstly, from the theoretical aspect, regarding the theory of interdependence, which has been the basis for RDTL state institutions to relate to each other (Feijó, 2022), but this did not happen in the VII government, because of the distrust of parliamentarians over the submission of government programs through the State Budget which was not approved twice in a row by a majority, causing the government to be replaced (Stanford/Timor Studies, 2018). If it is linked to the theory of interdependence, parliamentarians deliberately did not approve the government program and have contradicted the principle of dependency, meaning that parliamentarians should support the proposed program, not reject it, and can be called an act of political

camouflage against political friends and opponents (Guterres & Maschietto, 2025). So that the president of RDTL as head of state has the power to dissolve parliament by force as a result of not approving the draft of the second State Budget (Feijó & Lopes, 2023). Legal aspects; constitutionally the formation of the government has been regulated in article 106 paragraph K-RDTL 2002 (Wallis, 2020; Cabral, 2025).

This means that the winning party has the right to form a government even though other disuse guarana rights in parliament kale jumble from parties that have formed an alliance that have the same right to form a government (Carty, 2022), if this is the case, the constitution has given equal rights to both parties, but if examined more deeply this article creates ambiguous norms, meaning it does not provide legal certainty, so the implication is that when the winning party holds the government for 6 months and submits the State Budget to Parliament, then by itself (Makanya, 2023; Russell, 2023). The draft State Budget was not approved by the majority party (alliance) and resulted in the winning party being unable to continue running the government (Netswera & Khumalo, 2022). Third, the sociological aspect, with the motion of no confidence in the government, has implications for the government and the general public (Goldfinch et al., 2021; Nielsen & Lindvall, 2021; Xu et al., 2023), because the general administration system of government and services to the public has stopped, and if it is not followed up, the impact will be very large, then the president as head of state is tasked with supervising the implementation of government by state organs, has the authority to determine a repeat general election which gives rise to various risks in society (Ezeudu & James, 2024; Jafar et al., 2021). Especially the economy, work, education, etc.

Based on previous studies, Roy (2023) emphasized the importance of normative or doctrinal legal research in assessing the validity of legal actions according to legislation and legal principles, while Åberg & Denk (2025) highlighted that earlier studies largely focused on political conflicts and parliamentary processes in semi-presidential democracies in general, but paid less attention to the constitutional and social impacts of motions of no confidence on government stability in Timor-Leste. The findings indicate that although the president constitutionally has the authority to dissolve parliament, the ambiguity in Article 106 of the 2002 Timor-Leste Constitution creates legal uncertainty in practice, potentially leading to social and economic risks for the public. Consequently, this research contributes to strengthening legal certainty and understanding constitutional democratic practices in Timor-Leste.

The research aims to assess the legal validity of parliament dissolution and its implications for the government system, while its benefits include providing recommendations for policymakers, legal practitioners, and academics regarding the procedures for motions of no confidence and parliamentary dissolution in alignment with the rule of law and to maintain public administrative stability.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research uses doctrinal or normative research. According to Peter Mahmud Marzuki, all legal research is always normative. Normative research can also be called doctrinal research because the legal materials used as references are primary and secondary legal materials. Types of Approaches According to Peter Mahmud Marzuki, there are several approaches that can be

used in this research, namely the statute approach, the principle approach, and the conceptual approach. So the approach used is the legislative approach and conceptual analysis. Sources of Legal Material, Primary Legal Material, Secondary Legal Material Dobinson & Johns, Tertiary Legal Materials, Legal Material Collection Techniques, Legal Material Processing Techniques (Nugroho, 2019). Legal Material Analysis Techniques.

Data collection involves systematically gathering primary legal materials (such as the 2002 Constitution of Timor-Leste, laws, and regulations regarding parliamentary procedures), secondary legal materials (books, journal articles, commentaries, case law analyses), and tertiary legal materials (encyclopedias, legal dictionaries, online legal databases). The materials are collected through library research, official government and institutional websites, and legal databases.

Data analysis is conducted using content analysis and comparative legal analysis, interpreting the legal texts, identifying ambiguities, and critically comparing them with relevant jurisprudence and doctrines. The study also examines the social, political, and administrative implications of the dissolution process to provide a holistic understanding of its legal and practical significance. This systematic doctrinal methodology ensures that conclusions drawn are firmly grounded in existing legal frameworks while addressing gaps in prior research regarding the practical application and interpretation of motions of no confidence in Timor-Leste.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Legal Basis for the Dissolution of the National Parliament

Regarding the governance of the State of Timor-Leste, which occurred during the 7th Constitutional Government in 2017, this is certainly inseparable from the Constitutional norms that grant competence or authority to the State institutions of the Timor-Leste. According to Ryan Lesmomo, authority refers to the right or power held by a particular individual or legal entity to take action or make decisions within a specific framework. The concept of authority plays a crucial role in maintaining the balance of power within a system and ensuring that decisions are based on legitimate authority (Lesmomo, 2022). The President of the Republic as Head of State of the RDTL has Extra Legal authority or constitutional prerogative rights (Special Rights) to take political policies to dissolve Parliament based on Article 86, Authority of the President of the Republic regarding relations with Other Bodies. Point F. Article 100, paragraphs 1 and 2, also state that: a) The National Parliament may not be dissolved within six months of its election, during the final semester of the term of office of the President of the Republic, or in a state of war or emergency, as such an act of dissolution would be annulled and declared invalid. b) The dissolution of Parliament does not affect the continuation of its members in office until the first session of the National Parliament after the next general election.

Based on the legal facts of the formation of the Timor Leste government, starting from the 1st constitutional government to the 7th constitutional government in 2017, the State of Timor Leste often experienced tension, turmoil, and disputes between state institutions.

Political parties represented in Parliament did not embody the norms or basic principles of the RDTL constitution to realize the state's goals. In principle, the goal of a state is to realize prosperity and justice for all its people. This includes various aspects such as the protection of individual rights, the implementation of fair governance, the establishment of a harmonious social order, and the achievement of economic prosperity. The state also aims to safeguard sovereignty, maintain order and security, and promote good relations with other nations. These goals are set out in various state documents, such as the constitution or Basic Law, which serve as the foundation for the government in carrying out its duties and functions (Yusuf, 2021).

Adhering to the constitution Article 86 point f the President of the Republic takes the decision to dissolve Parliament and dismiss the government in accordance with article 112. According to the author's analysis of this decision from two legal perspectives, first, the President of the Republic needs to consider the objectives of the State as mandated by article 6 of the constitution. (a) To maintain and guarantee the sovereignty of the State; (e) To advance the development of a society based on social justice, by realizing physical well-being and the inner state of the citizens. The two Presidents of the Republic need to interpret and analyze article 106 which states: The Prime Minister will be appointed by a political party or by a coalition of political parties that have a majority of representatives in Parliament and will be appointed by the President of the Republic, after consulting with the political parties that hold seats in the National Parliament. This means that the President of the Republic does not need to rush to dissolve Parliament, because there are various alternative legal rules that guarantee the President of the Republic has the constitutional competence to call the Fretilin party as the winner/most votes in the election can be given the opportunity to continue negotiating political parties in parliament with a political orientation on the formation of the 8th Constitutional Government, without having to dissolve the parliament. Then third, considering that the decision to dissolve the parliament will cause tension in the stability of the country as well as the realization of the re-election or eleições antecipada will waste quite a lot of state finances, besides that there are also other critical obstacles faced by the country.

Measured from the three analyses and interpretations above, it indicates that the decision to dissolve the parliament is not a mandatory requirement. Moreover, during the 7th constitutional government in 2017, even though the government led by the Fretilin Party and the Democratic Party (PD) had a simple majority with 30 seats in parliament, the government had prepared a draft program and state finances and had been submitted for consideration in the Parliamentary debate. In an online media article titled Paralegal.Id., a program is defined as a policy instrument containing one or more activities implemented by a government agency/institution to achieve targets and objectives and obtain budget allocations, or community activities coordinated by a government agency. Meanwhile, a government program means efforts to implement established government policies. These programs appear in the Ministry's Strategic Plan or Government Work Plan (RKP) aimed at creating progress and prosperity for the community. If the government's program was deemed necessary to improve the welfare of the Timorese people, why did members of parliament propose a motion of no confidence in the government's program? Ultimately, the decision to dissolve parliament and dismiss the government was premature and legally illogical.

The Right of Members of Parliament to Propose a Motion of No Confidence

Timor-Leste, as a constitutional democracy, means that all actions must comply with applicable law. The action taken by members of Parliament to propose a motion of no confidence in the government is in accordance with Article 111 paragraph 1 of the 2002 K-RDTL, and is also regulated in Article 140 of the Rules of Procedure of the Timor-Leste National Parliament. a. Article 111 paragraph 1: Upon the proposal of one-quarter of the Members currently in office, the National Parliament may submit a motion of no confidence in the Government regarding the implementation of its program or on matters concerning the interests of the state. b. Special Regulation of the National Parliament, Section 3 Motion of No Confidence, Article 140 Initiative states: Podem ser apresentadas moções de censura ao Governo sobre a execução do seu programa ou assunto relevante de interesse nacional, in our terms of article 111.º of the Constitution, por um quarto dos Deputados em effcividade de funções. The substance of the two articles, first, gives members of parliament the right to submit a motion of no confidence in programs proposed by the government, the submission is made by a quarter of the members of parliament present. This shows that the proposal of a motion of no confidence based on a majority vote in both decisions is indeed related to several basic rights of members of Parliament such as the right of inquiry, the right of interpellation and the right to express an opinion. These rights are the ideal basis for parliament to provide official views or opinions regarding government policies or actions that are considered inappropriate or detrimental to the community. This means that if parliament feels that there is a policy that is unfair or violates the constitution, then members of parliament can express opinions and provide recommendations to the government. This is also used to suppress or improve policies that are considered problematic (Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Utara, 2025). Further discussion regarding the position and function of Parliament in issuing a motion of no confidence is influenced by two factors: 1) Because the governing parties, Fretilin and PD, only hold 30 seats compared to the 34 seats held by the opposition parties; 2) Due to the inability of Fretilin and the Democratic Party (PD) to maintain a majority, a motion of no confidence can be proposed under the system because the government has lost majority support in parliament. In general, a motion of no confidence arises when there is significant dissatisfaction with the performance or integrity of the leader or government in question. This is the issue faced by the governing parties, Fretilin and PD, during the 7th constitutional government in 2017. In addition to understanding the two factors mentioned above, a more in-depth analysis of why the 2017 Parliamentary Dissolution and Government Dismissal occurred is necessary, as will be carefully reviewed in the following analysis. 1)The 2017 election results showed that 23 political parties competed, and no single party achieved an absolute victory, allowing them to form a single government cabinet without the need for alliances or coalitions. 2)The 2017 election results showed that the Fretilin Party secured 29.7% of the vote, or 23 seats, while the CNRT secured 29.5% of the vote, or 22 seats, the PD secured 9.8% of the vote, or 7 seats, the PLP secured 10.6% of the vote, or 8 seats, and Khunto secured 6.4% of the vote. The other parties received no votes (Election Law of Timor Leste).

Table 1. 2017 election results

Political parties & alliances/blocs	Number of Votes Obtained	Percentage	Number of Seats
BUP,PLPA, PMD + PDRT	4.999	0,9 %	-
APMT	5,461	1,0%	-
KHUNTO	36,547	6,4%	5
PEP	6,775	1,2%	-
PST	4,891	0,9%	-
PDP	2,079	0,4%	-
CNRT	167,345	29,5%	22
PR	3.951	0,7%	-
UDT	11.255	2,0%	-
PDC	1.764	0,3%	-
MLPM	1,332	0,2%	-
PLP	60.098	10,6%	8
PD	55.608	9,8%	7
UNDERTIM	1.216	0,2%	-
PUDD	15.887	2,8%	-
PTD	661	0,1%	-
FM	8.849	1,6%	-
PSD	4.688	0,6%	-
PDN	3.846	0,7%	-
Fretilin	168.840	29,7%	23

The Fretilin Party, as the winner with 29.7% of the vote or 23 seats published or announced by the Rekursu Tribunal, received constitutional trust to form a government cabinet. However, to obtain a majority vote in parliament, Fretilin formed a coalition with the Democratic Party, with the number of seats from both parties being 30 (a government with a simple majority system) (Fundasaun Mahein, 2017). To ensure the tenure of the government between the Fretilin Party and the Democratic Party (PD), which only have 30 seats, before the two parties step forward as government organizers, there is a political offer that is a step or alternative with an Inclusive Government system. The aim of this offer means a government system that involves all political parties that have positions in Parliament can be given an equal opportunity to occupy positions in government. In addition, the implementation of an inclusive government to avoid the bad things and can create a stable condition that occurs in the process of governance such as: a) All parties feel a shared responsibility towards the state and nation. b) Avoidance of a no-confidence vote by members of Parliament. c) No re-elections (Eleições Antecipada). d) Deliberation of government programs in parliamentary debates proceeds smoothly and without obstacles. e) A very strict control and oversight system in the process of implementing good governance. f) Reducing the tendency for corruption, collusion, and nepotism. However, this proposal was rejected by the opposition party, despite efforts by the 7th constitutional government in 2017 to implement this system.

The Legality or Invalidity of the Dissolution of the National Parliament

Legal Basis for Filing a Motion of No Confidence

Article 111, paragraph 1 of the 2002 RDTL Constitution states that, upon the recommendation of one-quarter of its sitting Members, the National Parliament may file a motion of no confidence in the Government regarding the implementation of its programs or matters concerning the national interest. This means that for every government program policy, including state finances, submitted for consideration by Parliamentary debate, the government is required to provide a factual explanation that can convince the National Parliament of its legal understanding and understanding. This means that government program policies must be in the spirit or underpin national interests. In the current Timor Leste government system, we recognize the close relationship between the executive and the legislative. The position and process of the executive government are highly dependent on the power of the legislature in parliament. Conversely, the sustainability of the legislative mandate is highly dependent on the development programs implemented by the executive or government. Especially if the executive does not receive absolute trust (a motion of no confidence) from members of Parliament, the government will automatically fall, Article 112 point d) The government program is rejected for the second consecutive time. There will be a decision to dissolve Parliament and dismiss the government. Legal facts reflect that, when the 2017 Constitutional government carried out its obligations under Article 109 to submit a program for consideration and can be ratified in the Parliamentary debate, it was rejected with a motion of no confidence by a quarter of the members of the National Parliament, especially from the opposition party with a total of 34 seats, Article 112 point f) The motion of no confidence was approved by an absolute majority of the members who were serving. As a Constitutional Democracy, the formation of a government mandate is always through a democratic election system. Based on the results of the general election, competing political parties are expected to win an absolute majority or win a majority to form a government. The party that doesn't secure a majority will be positioned as the opposition. Now, we need to legally examine the crucial role of opposition parties in parliament, both within the process and within the government's mandate: a) Oversight of the government: The opposition serves as a watchdog over government policies and actions, ensuring that the policies taken do not harm the people and are in accordance with democratic principles and the constitution. b) Providing policy alternatives: The opposition often offers solutions and alternative policies to problems faced by the country, providing choices to the public and enriching debate in parliament. c) Criticizing and voicing the interests of the people: The opposition plays a role in voicing criticism of government policies deemed unfavorable to the people and representing groups or interests that may be overlooked. d) Maintaining the balance of power: In a democratic system, the opposition serves to ensure that the government does not control all aspects of power by providing a different perspective to prevent potential abuse of power. Overall, the opposition serves as a crucial pillar in a democratic system of government, creating a more transparent, accountable, and people-centered government.

Legal basis for government dismissal

Regarding the motion of no-confidence that occurred in the 7th Constitutional Government of 2017, in accordance with Article 106, after the appointment of the Prime Minister and his cabinet, inaugurated and sworn in by the President of the Republic, the government, under Article 108, prepares a draft Government Program, and Article 109, concerning the Consideration of the Government Program in Parliament. Constitutionally mandated by these two articles, the government is obligated to submit policies, programs, and State Finances to Parliament for approval. The logical consequence of this rejection, according to Article 112, is the dismissal of the government. The act of dismissing the government is rooted in several legal grounds (Constitution of RDTL, 2002): a) The President of the Republic accepts the resignation of the Prime Minister; b) The Government Program is rejected for a second consecutive term; c) A motion of confidence is not approved; d) The motion of no-confidence is approved by an absolute majority of the Members in office. The dismissal of the 7th Constitutional Government of 2017 was not due to abuse of power, not due to legitimacy of power, not due to unconstitutionality of government. But on the one hand, it can be said that the dismissal of the government has a constitutional legal basis, but on the other hand there is a tendency towards political interests or vice versa, there is political interest between members of parliament who represent each political party in parliament. In fact, seen from the legality of the 7th Constitutional Government of 2017, it is strong and consistent because the government has legal legitimacy and political legitimacy through democratic elections. The government has prepared the country's physical and financial programs to Parliament, but members of parliament deliberately rejected it by submitting a motion of no confidence.

Extra-Legal Decisions of the President of the Republic

When a motion of no confidence by the Legislature against the Executive hindered the government's mission, initiated by the Fretilin Party and the PD Party, this situation created controversial tensions among various parties, with varying legal interpretations and perspectives within the RDTL. Consequently, the President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was forced to resort to extra-legal measures, namely, issuing a decree to dismiss the government and dissolve Parliament. Addressing these three cases requires policy action and decision-making from both legal and political perspectives, which fall within the authority and discretion of the President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. According to B. N. Marbun, also known as Benedictus Nahot Marbun, a political dictionary author, policy is a series of concepts and principles that serve as the outline and basis for plans for implementing work, leadership within an organization or government, and a statement of ideals, principles, goals, or intentions as guidelines for achieving these targets.

In addition to examining the theory of policy, the author presents an analysis of the policy of the President of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste by using decisions in the extra-legal system to resolve the political crisis and institutional crisis that occurred in the 7th Constitutional government in 2017. In an article quoted from the Internet media, extra-legal decisions in the government system refer to decisions taken by authorities (for example government officials, institutions, or bodies in power) that are not based on existing legal

regulations or do not have a clear legal basis. In other words, these decisions are taken outside the applicable legal framework, and often contradict existing regulations or laws. Extra-legal decisions can occur in emergency situations or when government institutions feel the need to take quick steps that are not regulated in existing regulations. However, such actions can cause controversy because they have the potential to violate the principles of the rule of law which require all government actions to be based on clear and fair laws. The statement above is concretely relevant to the decision of the President of the Republic of Timor Leste in resolving the political crisis in 2017. First, the decision is legitimate because it is adjusted to Article 86 point f and Article 100 of the RDTL constitution. Secondly, the decision did indeed cause controversy among all parties, because the President's decision when issuing Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2018 concerning the Re-election (*Eleições Antecipada*) this system is not written or not regulated in the RDTL constitution. When linked to article 66 concerning the opinion poll but this rule is too general, and does not reflect the elaboration of the important and specific meaning of the rules of the article to facilitate public understanding.

However, it can be respected that, for all the efforts of the President of the Republic based on the principle of extra-legal decisions, it can resolve and normalize the situation of the country of Timor Leste in 2017 through the results of the realization of the Opinion Poll or *Eleições Anteci* on January 26, 2018. Indeed, legally reviewed there are interpretations and interpretations between all components of the Timor Leste Nation that are different or the emergence of controversy and tension that the extra-legal decision of the President of the Republic is not based on clear and fair legal provisions, only all parties need to think clearly and consistently that this decision is one of the positive steps that need to be taken by the President of the Republic of Timor Leste in dealing with the problem of the Political crisis and the severe institutional crisis in the 7th Constitutional Government in 2017.

In fact, based on the constitutional competence of the President of the Republic in article 86 points d and f regarding the mechanism of the decision to dissolve Parliament and article 112 regarding the mechanism for the Dismissal of the Government, the most important decision-making steps by the President of the Republic in the political crisis in 2017 through: a) Before dismissing the Government and dissolving Parliament, the President of the Republic shall speak with the State Council in accordance with Article 91, points a, b, and c. b) Converse with the National Parliament, particularly with the political parties with a majority in Parliament, regarding the legal and political mechanisms for dismissing the Government and dissolving Parliament. c) Converse with the Government to convey the legal and political mechanisms for dismissing the Government and dissolving Parliament. d) Converse with the Judicial/judicial bodies to obtain legal validity for the mechanisms for dismissing the Government and dissolving Parliament. e) Convey to the public factual and credible information about the political situation and conditions of the state that threaten sovereignty and security stability regarding the issue of dissolving Parliament and dismissing the Government. f) After completing discussions with all state institutions, the President of the Republic shall issue Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2018, dated January 26, concerning the *Eleições Antecipada*. The policies and decisions of the President of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste regarding the *Eleições Antecipada* are based on extra-legal legal analysis and

interpretation in accordance with Article 66 of the RDTL Constitution concerning the referendum system. Elections (General Elections) are a process by which citizens elect their representatives in government, including executive, presidential, and legislative positions. Elections can also be used to elect other officials in accordance with a country's regulations. Elections are a concrete manifestation of the principle of democracy, where supreme power rests with the people. Through elections, the people have the right to choose leaders and representatives who will make important decisions for the country and the region. Elections must be conducted based on the principles of freedom and fairness, with all election participants (political parties, candidates, voters) having equal opportunities and without any manipulation in the process (Yusuf, 2021). The purpose of the 2017 re-elections (Eleições Antecipada), which resulted from the dissolution of parliament, was to elect new members of parliament and ensure the continuation of the legitimate system of government. Parliamentary dissolution can occur for various reasons, such as the parliament's inability to function effectively, political tensions, constitutional requirements for the dissolution of parliament, or a legislative vote of no confidence in the government's program for a specific period.

Several points of analysis regarding the purpose of the re-elections (Eleições Antecipada): a) Elections are held to elect new members of parliament, who will again represent the people and carry out legislative duties, such as making laws and overseeing government policy. b) Following the dissolution of parliament, elections allow the people to grant a new mandate to the elected candidates, ensuring that their representatives remain in parliament with renewed legitimacy. c) Parliamentary dissolutions often occur in situations of political crisis, and elections can help find solutions and stability by providing the people with the opportunity to re-elect a more effective government or representative system. d) Elections held after the dissolution of parliament serve as a means of ensuring that the democratic system continues to operate according to the principles of free and fair elections. e) Elections provide an opportunity for the emergence of new faces in government, introducing fresh ideas and innovations in the legislature to respond to the evolving needs of society.

Thus, the elections held as a result of the dissolution of parliament are an important step to maintain the continuity of legitimate government, respond to political dynamics, and fulfill the needs of a healthy democracy. Based on the results of the 2018 Eleições Antecipada, there were 19 political parties competing. The AMP Party won with 49.54% of the votes and 34 seats, forming the 8th Constitutional government for the 2018-2023 legislative period. The alliance party known as "Aliança Mudansa ba Progressu" AMP consisted of the CNRT, PLP, and KHUNTO parties, which won a majority of votes in the 2018 re-election. In accordance with the principles of constitutional legality, the 8th Constitutional Government for the 2018-2023 term was officially inaugurated and took the oath of office from the President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste on Friday, June 22, 2018, Timor-Leste time. The following table shows the results of the 2018 elections:

Table 2. 2018 elections results

No	Partido Votos % +/- Deputados	Partido Votos % +/- Deputados	Partido Votos % +/- Deputados	Partido Votos % +/- Deputados	Partido Votos % +/- Deputados
1	Aliança Mudança para o Progresso	309 663	49,58 / 100,00	3,11	34 / 65
2	Fretilin	213 324	34,16 / 100,00	4,51	23 / 65
3	Partido Democratico	50370	8,07/100,00	1,72	5/65
4	FDD	34301	5,49/100,00	1,52	3/65
5	PEP	5060	0,81/100,00	0,39	0/65
6	Movimento de Dezenvolvimento Nacional	4494	0,72/100,00	0,70	0/65
7	Partido Republicano	4125	0,66/100,00	-	0/65
8	Movimento Social Democratico	3188	0,51/100,00	1,90	0/65
	Total eleitorado/Partir[asa un	784 286	80,98 / 100,00	4,24	

CONCLUSION

The dissolution of the National Parliament of Timor-Leste in 2017 was legally grounded in the constitutional authority of the President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, who, after coordinating with the State Council and other institutions, acted in accordance with the 2002 RDTL Constitution to issue Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2018. Although it required holding a repeat election (*Eleição Antecipada*), this decision upheld the principles of the rule of law and democracy that have shaped the state for two decades. The normative analysis indicates that the dissolution and dismissal of the Constitutional Government did not stem from issues of abuse of power, unconstitutionality, or governmental legitimacy, but from constitutional procedures following the Motion of No-Confidence by Members of the National Parliament in the 7th Constitutional Government of Timor Leste. Future research should explore the effectiveness and limits of presidential authority in resolving parliamentary deadlocks within constitutional democracies, using comparative studies from other post-conflict democratic states.

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